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Abstract 
We investigate Swedish firms’ use of financial hedges to reduce their foreign exchange exposure for 1997–2001. 
The study uses survey data, which enables us to differentiate between hedging aimed at translation exposure and 
transaction exposure, respectively. The survey responses show that more than 50% of the firms employ financial 
hedges and that transaction exposure is more frequently hedged than translation exposure. We find that the 
likelihood of using financial hedges is increasing with firm size and exposure and that liquidity constraints are 
important in explaining transaction exposure hedging. Importantly, we find that the existence of loan covenants 
explains translation exposure hedging. This suggests that firms hedge translation exposure in order to prevent 
costly violations of loan covenants. 
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  11. Introduction 
Why widely held firms, whose owners have the ability to hold diversified portfolios of 
securities, elect to employ financial hedges to reduce their foreign exchange (FX) exposures 
has been under debate. Theoretical research has shown that risk-reducing efforts may be value 
enhancing if they successfully alleviate costs associated with market imperfections (see Smith 
and Stulz, 1985; Bessembinder, 1991; Froot et al., 1993). 
Empirical studies have investigated whether firms’ use of currency derivatives conforms 
to the predictions from theoretical research.
1 Mian (1996) examines 3,022 COMPUSTAT 
firms out of which 440 are identified as currency derivatives users from footnotes in their 
annual reports. The evidence from Mian’s (1996) study supports that hedging activities 
exhibit economies of scale but provides weak, if any, support for the theoretical models that 
explain hedging activities by the existence of market imperfections. Like Mian (1996), Géczy 
et al. (1997) use a dichotomous measure of currency derivatives use obtained from footnotes 
in annual reports for a sample of 372 of the Fortune 500 non-financial firms in 1990. They 
find that firms with extensive FX exposure and economies of scale are more likely to use 
currency derivatives. Importantly, they also find that firms with less liquidity and greater 
growth opportunities (as measured by the expenses for R&D) are more likely to use currency 
derivatives. They interpret this as evidence that firms use currency derivatives to reduce cash 
flow variations that might otherwise preclude firms from investing in valuable growth 
opportunities.  
Graham and Rogers (2000) investigate 161 COMPUSTAT firms that face foreign 
exchange exposure out of which one third is identified as currency derivatives users. They 
                                                 
1 To conserve space, the presentation of earlier research is confined to empirical studies that examine why firms 
use currency derivatives. Studies like Nance et al. (1993), Dolde (1995), Berkman and Bradbury (1996), Gay and 
Nam (1998), and Guay (1999) analyze why firms use derivatives, but are not confined to any particular type of 
exposure. Tufano (1996) and Haushalter (2000) examine why firms use derivatives to hedge gold and oil price 
exposure respectively. 
  2find that firms hedge in response to expected financial distress costs, firm size, and 
investment opportunities. In addition, their results show that firms hedge in order to increase 
debt capacity but not in response to convexities in tax schedules. Allayannis and Ofek (2001) 
analyze firm characteristics associated with adoption of and level of currency derivatives 
usage for a sample of 378 US non-financial firms. Their evidence concerning the decision to 
adopt currency derivatives use corroborates the evidence of Géczy et al. (1997) whilst the 
degree of FX exposure is shown to be the only important factor in explaining the amount of 
currency derivatives used.  
Finally, Hagelin (2003) examines 101 Swedish firms use of currency derivatives. The 
study uses survey data in combination with publicly available data for 1997 and examines the 
association between firm characteristics and hedging of translation (TL) exposure, committed 
transaction (CT) exposure, and anticipated transaction (AT) exposure. This is of interest since 
transaction exposure and TL exposure tend to affect firms differently. Transaction exposure to 
currency risk refers to potential changes in the value of future cash flows as a result of 
unexpected changes in exchange rates while TL exposure arises as the financial accounting 
statements of foreign affiliates are translated into the currency of the parent firm.
2 Since TL 
gains (losses) tend to be unrealized and have little direct impact on firms’ cash flows and 
market values the general recommendation of the finance literature is to not hedge TL 
                                                 
2 TL exposure depends on the translation method used. The International Accounting Standard 21 (IAS 21) 
suggests the use of the current rate method for self-contained foreign affiliates and the use of the temporal 
method for integrated foreign affiliates and for foreign affiliates in countries with high inflation. The exposure 
under the current rate method is given by the equity of the foreign affiliate, whereas under the temporal method 
it is the net amount of assets and liabilities translated at the current exchange rate. Changes in exchange rates on 
foreign operations thus always cause changes in group equity and under the temporal method, these changes also 
affect group net income. Swedish firms follow The Swedish Institute of Authorised Public Accountants’ 
proposal to recommendation, which builds on the IAS 21. In practice, the current rate method dominates among 
Swedish firms. 
  3exposure.
3 Hagelin’s (2003) results are consistent with the conjecture that firms hedge 
transaction exposure with currency derivatives to increase firm value by reducing costs 
associated with market imperfections. No evidence is found to support the notion that TL 
exposure hedges are used to increase firm value.
4 
In similarity with Hagelin (2003), we investigate the association between firm 
characteristics and hedging of TL exposure, CT exposure, and AT exposure for Swedish 
firms. This study adds to Hagelin (2003) in several ways. First, we examine the relationship 
between the existence of loan covenants and hedging. The motive for this is that one possible 
explanation for firms hedging TL exposure would be the existence of loan covenants 
requiring firms to maintain certain levels of accounting performance to retain access to funds 
and that this performance measure is affected by TL gains and losses (see e.g. Butler, 2000; 
Eiteman et al., 2001). That firms use covenants that are affected by TL gains and losses is 
suggested by Smith and Warner (1979). They show that covenants based, implicitly or 
                                                 
3 Oxelheim and Wihlborg (1997) offer one potentially interesting observation on the relationship between TL 
exposure hedging and hedging of cash flows. They note that if the translation FX rate is a close proxy for a 
weighted average of future FX rates at the time cash flows occur then the economic exposure and the TL 
exposure are nearly identical. If so, by hedging TL exposure, firms may successfully reduce economic exposure. 
It could be that through experience firms develop proxies for economic exposure, which is being hedged, while 
being confined conceptually to TL and transaction exposure. We note however that the results of Hagelin (2003), 
suggesting that firms hedge transaction exposure to increase firm value by reducing costs associated with market 
imperfections, but that no evidence is found to support the notion that TL exposure hedges are used to increase 
firm value, do not support this explanation for TL exposure hedging. 
4 This finding is interesting given that firms spend real resources on hedging their TL exposure. Aggarwal’s 
(1991) finding, that managers pay attention to TL exposure, is also interesting in this context. He compares firms 
that voluntary adopted FAS 52 with firms that did not. Specifically, differences between the early and late 
adopters among the largest 100 US industrial firms are analyzed. The result lends support to the contention that 
managerial preferences for reporting higher income is a major reason for the early adoption of FAS 52. For this 
reason Aggarwal (1991) contends that managers pay attention to the choice of translation method and thus, 
contrary to the conventional wisdom, to the impact from TL exposure per se. 
  4explicitly, on net worth are commonly observed. To our knowledge, the present study is the 
first attempt to empirically document the relationship between hedging and TL exposure.
5 
Second, we use questionnaire data covering a five-year period (1997–2001) while 
Hagelin (2003) uses data for only one year. The use of data covering five years enables us to 
study whether recorded relationships hold over time and if these relationships also are able to 
explain changes in hedging policies. Finally, in contrast to Hagelin (2003) and most of the 
previous studies, hedging activity is not only approximated by hedging with currency 
derivatives but also by hedging with foreign denominated debt. This, like the use of data 
covering five years, should improve the reliability of the results. 
We find that use of financial hedges to reduce FX exposure is widespread. More than 50 
percent of the observations are for firms that hedge FX exposure. We find that transaction 
exposure is more frequently hedged than TL exposure although as much as 20 percent of the 
firms hedge their TL exposure. From the survey responses it is shown that about one tenth of 
the sample firms changed their hedging policy concerning TL, CT, and AT exposure each 
year in favor of adoption of hedging while changes seldom meant that firms quit hedging. 
We estimate logit regressions to analyze firm characteristics associated with the 
likelihood of using financial hedges. In accordance with the evidence from studies of US 
firms, we find that larger firms are more likely to employ financial hedges. We also find that 
firms with greater FX exposures are more likely to use financial hedges. The results for size 
and FX exposure are consistent with the conjecture that fixed costs act as a barrier to small 
firms and firms with low degrees of FX exposure. The logit results also show that the 
                                                 
5 Studies that examine the effect of loan covenants exist. For instance, Core and Schrand (1999) use an option 
pricing framework to model equity valuation when firms face costs associated with violating accounting based 
debt covenants. Their model shows that the value of equity depends on two factors: the economic value of the 
firm and the probability that the firm violates the covenant. Other examples are Roberts and Viscione (1984) that 
examine the effect of covenants on bond yields and Leland (1994) who investigates the effect of covenants on 
optimal capital structure. 
  5likelihood of using financial hedges for CT exposure increases with decreases in liquidity, 
which corroborates the view that firms with low levels of liquidity hedge to reduce the 
probability of encountering financial distress, as suggested by Nance et al. (1993). In parallel 
with earlier studies that use the market-to-book ratio to approximate for growth opportunities 
(see Mian, 1996; Géczy et al., 1997; Graham and Rogers, 2000; Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; 
Hagelin, 2003) we fail to document the expected positive association between hedging and 
growth opportunities. Interestingly, we are able to document a significant positive association 
between TL exposure hedging and the existence of loan covenants. This finding suggests that 
firms hedge TL exposure to avoid that loan covenants are violated. 
The relationship between firm characteristics and the level of exposure hedged of a 
particular exposure is also investigated. Like Allayannis and Ofek (2001) we find that the 
level of exposure hedged is largely unrelated to differences in firm characteristics. 
The study is organized as follows: The next section contains a description of the sample 
selection procedure and presents our findings on firms’ FX exposure and hedging practices. 
Section 3 describes the research design and how the variables are defined. The cross-sectional 
results are presented in section 4, which is followed by a conclusion. 
 
2. Sample selection, FX exposure, and hedging practices 
2.1. Sample selection 
Because detailed public data are not available on firms’ FX exposures and hedging practices, 
we employ three questionnaires to determine exposures and firms’ use of financial hedges.
6 
                                                 
6 The accounting practices regarding exposures and hedging for Swedish firms did not follow strict rules over 
the course of the sample period. New rules and regulations based on IAS 39 will be introduced, but were not in 
effect during the sample period. Recommendations from Bokföringsnämnden (BFN R9) stipulated that firms 
should report net revenues, investments, and employees for geographical markets, with considerable freedom in 
deciding what the “geographical market” was. Of two accounting methods allowed for hedging, deferral 
accounting and mark-to-market, almost all firms used deferral accounting. Firms were required to disclose 
  6The first questionnaire was sent to 160 firms in October 1997, and contained questions 
concerning the respondents’ inherent exposures and hedging policies for 1997. The second 
questionnaire was sent to 275 firms in March 2000, followed by the third questionnaire, sent 
to 261 firms in September 2001. The three questionnaires are nearly identical; however, the 
latter two each included one question regarding the types of exposure hedged with foreign 
denominated debt while the last questionnaire asked firms whether they were subject to loan 
covenants or not. The questionnaires of 2000 and 2001 asked questions concerning 1998–
1999 and 2000–2001, respectively. The questionnaires are presented in Hagelin and Pramborg 
(2004). 
The questionnaires were sent to firms that met the following three criteria: (i) the firm 
was listed at the Stockholm Stock Exchange; (ii) the firm was a non-financial firm; and (iii) 
the firm’s headquarter was located in Sweden. Financial firms were excluded because the 
focus of the study is on end-users rather than producers of financial services. Foreign firms 
were also excluded (firms with headquarters located outside Sweden) to eliminate differences 
between firms arising from differences in accounting standards between countries.  
One hundred and one, 130, and 128 usable responses were obtained from the first, 
second, and third questionnaire, representing response rates of 63, 47, and 49 percent, 
respectively. This can be compared with Bodnar et al.’s (1996) 26 percent response rate. The 
three surveys rendered a total of 617 firm-year observations. To check for potential non-
response bias, the sample firms were compared with firms that did not return the 
questionnaires; this comparison indicated no response bias.
7 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
derivatives positions in footnotes, and most firms reported a net position rather than per currency, type of 
exposures hedged, or exposures partitioned over time. It is also noteworthy that practices varied widely among 
firms. Overall accounting practices for international operations and hedging seem to some extent to lag those in 
the US, at least for the sample period. 
7 Results are available by request from the authors. 
  72.2. FX exposure and hedging practices 
Firms were asked in the questionnaires what proportion of revenues (FR), proportion of costs 
(FC), and proportion of equity (FE) that were denominated in foreign currencies each year. 
Respondents were also asked whether or not they hedged FX exposure with currency 
derivatives, and, if so, whether their hedging concerned TL, CT, and/or AT exposure. 
Specifically, they were asked how much of each exposure they hedged. In addition, they were 
asked whether they used foreign denominated debt for hedging purposes, and, in the second 
and third questionnaire, which type of FX exposure that was hedged with foreign 
denominated debt. 
Table 1, Panel A, presents FR, FC, FE, and the absolute net exposure (ANE), defined as 
the absolute value of the difference between FR and FC. This measure, our proxy for 
transaction exposure, draws on that suggested by Marston (2001) and captures the potential 
eﬀect of a net position (long or short) in foreign currency. In Table 1, statistics for the pooled 
sample of firm-year observations are presented, where the sample firms are divided into 
different groups based on size. A book value of total assets of less than SEK 500 million is 
considered small, more than SEK 500 million but less than SEK 5000 million is considered 
medium, and more than SEK 5000 million is considered large. 
From Panel A in Table 1 it can be seen that the average FR is 39.5 percent while the 
average FC is 30.6 percent, which suggests that our sample of firms is more involved in 
exporting than importing businesses. From the table it is evident that larger firms, on average, 
are characterized by higher FR and FC than small firms are. Even though larger firms have 
higher levels of FR and FC than small firms have, there is a tendency for firms being 
categorized as small to have higher levels of ANE than for firms being categorized as large. 
For the pooled sample of small firms the average ANE is 22 percent, suggesting that small 
firms are subject to considerable levels of FX exposure. Panel A also shows that the average 
  8FE is 17.8 percent for the pooled sample and that FE is increasing with firm size. This 
suggests that larger firms are more likely to be multinationals than small firms are which in 
turn suggests that larger firms have more opportunities to employ operational hedges than 
small firms. 
Panel B in Table 1 shows the percentage of firms that hedged FX, TL, CT, and AT 
exposure for the pooled sample of firm-year observations. Like Panel A Panel B presents the 
results broken down by size group. From Panel B it can be seen that 57.2 percent of the 
observations for the pooled sample are for firms that used currency derivatives or foreign 
denominated debt to hedge FX exposure. It can also be seen that 23.1 percent of the 
observations are for firms that hedged TL exposure, whereas 42.6 and 31.8 percent of the 
observations are for firms that hedged CT and AT exposure, respectively. We do not report 
numbers for each sample year but note that the pooled sample is representative for each year 
and size group with the exception that the percentage of hedgers is higher for all size groups 
for 1997 than for the other sample years. This is likely a result from the sample construction 
rather than from any economy wide changes is hedging policies. 
In addition, we investigated if specific firms changed their hedging policy concerning 
FX, TL, CT, and AT exposure, respectively. It is evident from Figure 1 that most firms did 
not change their policy as to whether a particular exposure category should be hedged or not. 
However, out of firms that changed policy more observations are for firms that began to 
hedge than for firms that quit hedging. 
 
3. Research design and variable definition 
In this section, we present the variables used in our logit regressions to investigate among the 
potential explanations for using financial hedges for FX, TL, CT, and AT exposure 
respectively. The explanatory variables for these regressions include proxies for economies of 
  9scale, expected costs of financial distress, the underinvestment problem associated with costly 
external financing, and firms’ FX exposure.
8 How proxies are defined and reasons as to why 
these variables are included are as follows: 
a)  Firm size. Empirical research supports the perception that starting and managing a 
hedging program is associated with significant economies of scale (see e.g. Géczy et 
al., 1997). These economies arise from fixed costs associated with, among other 
things, training employees and developing hedging strategies. We use the log of the 
book value of total assets as a proxy for size. 
b)  Liquidity. Hedging can increase the value of the firm by lowering the expected costs of 
financial distress (see Smith and Stulz, 1985). Nance et al. (1993) argue that the 
probability of encountering financial distress can be reduced by maintaining more 
liquid assets, and thereby reducing the need for hedging. We use the ratio of current 
assets to current liabilities as a proxy for liquidity. 
c)  Leverage. Hedging can reduce the variance of the value of the firm and thereby the 
expected cost of financial distress (see Smith and Stulz, 1985). Leverage can therefore 
                                                 
8 In addition to the rationales for hedging investigated in this study theorists have provided another two. One 
rationale focuses on hedging as a means to reduce tax costs due convexity of the tax schedule and the second 
focuses on hedging as a means to maximize managers’ private utility. The motive for not examining tax based 
explanations related to the convexity in the tax schedule is the failure of earlier studies to document a 
relationship between use of currency derivatives and tax convexity (see Mian, 1996; Géczy et al., 1997; Graham 
and Rogers, 2000; Allayannis and Ofek, 2001). Graham and Rogers (2000) conclude that firms do not hedge in 
response to convexity because the incentive is small relative to other hedging incentives. In a later study, 
Graham and Rogers (2002) show that although hedging cannot be explained by tax convexity, hedging may 
reduce costs associated with taxes since it allows for more debt in the capital structure. Similarly, the rationale 
for not examining motives related to managers’ private utility is the relatively weak support for this class of 
explanations in earlier empirical studies on currency derivatives usage (see Géczy et al., 1997; Graham and 
Rogers, 2000; Hagelin, 2003). A notable exception is a recent study by Knopf et al. (2002) who show that as the 
sensitivity of managers’ stock and stock option portfolios to stock price (return volatility) increases, firms tend to 
hedge more (less). 
  10be hypothesized to be positively related to hedging. We use the book value of debt 
divided by the book value of equity as a proxy for leverage. 
d)  Market-to-book. Bessembinder (1991) demonstrates that hedging reduces the incentive 
to underinvest since hedging shifts individual future states from default to non-default 
outcomes. Because firms with more valuable growth opportunities are more likely to 
be affected by the underinvestment problem, these firms may be more likely to hedge. 
As a measure of future growth opportunities, we use the ratio of the market to the 
book value of total assets. 
e)  Industry dummies. We divide the sample into different industry sectors since we 
expect the typical levels of exposure to vary across industry sectors. We use the same 
industry sector categories as Bodnar et al. (1996) do, namely, primary products, 
manufacturing, and services. 
f)  Foreign exchange exposure. Given the fixed costs associated with a derivatives 
program the decision to initiate one is not only determined by whether FX exposure 
exists or not, but also by its level. We use one proxy for transaction exposure and one 
for translation exposure. As a proxy for transaction exposure, the absolute value of the 
difference between FR and FC (i.e. ANE) is used. As a measure for translation 
exposure, we use the percentage of the firm’s equity that is denominated in foreign 
equity (FE). 
g)  Loan covenants. Butler (2000), Eitman et al. (2001) among others argues that the 
existence of loan covenants can explain why firms engage in hedging activities. The 
rationale for this is that loan covenants require that a firm maintain certain levels of 
performance and that a violation of a loan covenant can lead to a reduction in 
borrowing capacity. In these circumstances, a hedge can ensure that the firm retains its 
access to funds. We use a dummy variable that is assigned a value of 1 if loan 
  11covenants exist, and 0 otherwise (Note that data is only available for year 2000 and 
2001). This variable is of special interest since, to our knowledge, this study is the first 
attempt to empirically analyze the relationship between hedging and loan covenants. 
Data for creating the explanatory variables f) and g) are taken from the questionnaires. The 
accounting data required to calculate the explanatory variables a) – d) are collected from the 
stock market guide Nordbanken Aktieguide Sommar 2001 and annual reports. For variable e) 
we use the industry classification from SCB (Statistics Sweden) standard SNI 92. 
Table 2 presents median values for variable a) – d) and mean values for e) and g) for 
each year and for the pooled sample of firm-year observations.  It can be seen from the table 
that no apparent trends exist even though the values fluctuate between the years. Table 2 also 
shows that about 60 percent of the firms are categorized as belonging to the service industry 
while less than 10 percent are categorized as primary producers. Interestingly, as much as one 
quarter of the firms is subject to loan covenants. This widespread use of covenants is in 
accordance with Smith and Warner (1979). 
 
4. Cross-sectional results 
4.1. Logit regression estimates on usage of financial hedges 
We estimate logit regressions to distinguish among the potential explanations for use of 
financial hedges. Table 3 presents the results of logit regressions of binary variables 
representing usage of financial hedges. For each observation, the binary variables are assigned 
a value of one if the firm use financial instruments, i.e. currency derivatives or foreign 
denominated debt, to hedge a particular exposure, and zero otherwise. For all regressions, 
coefficient estimates, p-values, and McFadden R
2 values are presented. In Panel A, the 
dependent variable is set to one for firms that use financial hedges to hedge FX exposure and 
zero for nonusers. Panel B, C, and D present results broken down by type of FX exposure that 
  12is hedged. More specifically, Panel B uses TL exposure hedging as the dependent variable; 
Panel C uses CT exposure hedging as the dependent variable; and Panel D uses AT exposure 
hedging as the dependent variable in the logit regression estimation. 
The data include observations on an unbalanced panel of 89 to 116 firms per year for five 
years. In addition to the results for each respective year we also present regression results for 
the pooled sample. Pooling firm-year observations treats each observation as independent, 
which tends to underestimate standard errors and overstate reported p-values to the extent that 
firm values are correlated from year to year. Therefore, as a robustness test, we also 
performed panel data regressions using population average models. The results are similar to 
those for the pooled sample in Table 3 and are therefore not presented. 
All regressions, except two with TL exposure as the dependent variable, show that 
greater firm size is significantly associated with greater probability of financial hedging at the 
10 percent level. This result strongly supports the hypothesis that a firm’s choice of whether 
to use financial hedges or not is influenced by the existence of economies of scale and is in 
parallel with earlier studies investigating currency derivatives usage (see Mian, 1996; Géczy 
et al., 1997; Graham and Rogers, 2000; Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Hagelin, 2003). 
The coefficient for liquidity is negative, as predicted, for 26 out of 29 regressions and 
significant at the 10 percent level for 11 out of these 26 regressions. From the table it is 
evident that the results vary across time period and exposure category being investigated. 
Significance is indicated for the pooled regression models with FX, TL, and CT exposure as 
dependent variables as well as for individual years for these exposure categories. The result 
for CT exposure is in accordance with our expectations and we interpret this evidence as 
being indicative of that firms hedge CT exposure in response to their liquidity and to reduce 
the likelihood of financial distress. The result for TL exposure on the other hand is 
unexpected. This is because TL gains (losses) tend to be unrealized and have little direct 
  13impact on firms’ cash flows. Perhaps the result is due to the fact that more than 95 percent of 
the firms that hedged TL exposure also hedged transaction exposure. To investigate this we 
made two robustness tests. First, we re-ran the regression presented in Table 3 for the pooled 
sample of firms treating those observations that hedged TL exposure only as TL hedgers and 
all other observations as non-hedgers.
9 This treatment results in that only 12 out of 419 
observations are classified as TL hedgers and calls for a cautious interpretation of the results. 
The results from the regression are not presented in any detail but indicate that liquidity is 
unrelated to TL hedging. Second, we re-ran the regressions on TL exposure, allowing only 
firms that did not hedge any other type of FX exposure to remain in the sample as non-
hedgers. For this specification the significance of liquidity is indicated less frequently than as 
reported in Table 3. These robustness tests suggest that the indicated relationship between 
liquidity and TL exposure in Table 3 is uncertain. 
For leverage, only one coefficient is found to be significant at the 10 percent level. In 
addition, contrary to the prediction, this coefficient is found to be negative. The finding that 
no significant positive association between leverage and use of financial hedges exists is in 
accordance with Géczy et al. (1997), Allayannis and Ofek (2001), and Hagelin (2003), but in 
contrast to Graham and Rogers (2000). 
In contrast to our prediction, for the pooled regressions the coefficients for the market-to 
book ratio is negative and significant at the 10 percent level. We note that the results from 
running regressions on separate years indicate that the sign of the coefficient changed during 
the sample period from negative to positive for year 2001. One possible explanation for the 
negative coefficients is the high valuation of firms belonging to the so-called “new economy” 
until early 2000. This is because many firms that constitute this group typically had no 
reasons to employ hedges as their existing cash flows were small. In general, the risks these 
                                                 
9 The sample size did not allow for inclusion of any industry dummies in this specification. 
  14firms faced were not related to changes in exchange rates but rather to project risk and access 
to external financing. The failure to document a positive relationship between the market-to-
book ratio and hedging is in parallel with that of earlier studies (see Mian, 1996; Géczy et al., 
1997; Graham and Rogers, 2000; Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Hagelin, 2003) on usage of 
currency derivatives. 
The coefficients for the industry dummies provide evidence suggesting that the 
likelihood of hedging is related to industry belonging. In short, firms belonging to the 
categories primary products and manufacturing are more likely to hedge FX, TL, and CT 
exposure than firms in the service category. This evidence is in accordance with the survey 
evidence of Alkebäck and Hagelin (1999) for Sweden and Bodnar et al. (1996) for the US. 
In accordance with our prediction, firms with larger absolute differences in revenues and 
costs denominated in foreign currency (ANE) are more likely to use financial hedges to hedge 
FX, CT, and AT exposure. In detail, the coefficients for ANE are positive for all regressions 
and significance is indicated for the four pooled sample regressions and for 16 out of the 19 
regressions on individual years. The results for foreign equity (FE) are also in accordance 
with the prediction, i.e. the likelihood of TL exposure hedging increases with FE. This finding 
is contrary to Hagelin (2003), who argues that the failure to document the predicted 
relationship in his study may be due to that many firms being classified as non-hedgers do 
hedge TL exposure with foreign denominated debt. The fact that we classify both currency 
derivatives hedging and foreign denominated debt hedging as hedging activity and are able to 
document the predicted relationship corroborates his view. 
The logit regression results show that hedging is significantly associated with the 
existence of loan covenants, at least for TL exposure hedging. We interpret this finding as 
evidence that firms hedge TL exposure in order to avoid that loan covenants are violated and 
thereby maintain their access to funds, as Butler (2000) among others suggests. This finding is 
  15important given that the theoretical models of Smith and Stulz (1985), Bessembinder (1991), 
and Froot et al. (1993) do not attempt to explain TL exposure hedging.  
McFadden R
2 values for the regressions in Table 3 range from 14.1 to 50.8 percent and 
are typically higher for the category FX exposure than for the others. This is likely to be a 
result of that firms recorded as non-hedgers of a particular FX exposure may hedge another 
type of FX exposure. For example, if firms that hedge CT and AT exposure do so to alleviate 
the underinvestment problem, they are expected to be characterized by similar firm-specific 
traits. However, if a substantial number of the firms only hedge CT exposure (perhaps 
because their expected cash flows are troublesome to predict) and consequently are classified 
as non-hedgers of AT exposure, the results in Panel D are blurred since firms classified as 
hedgers and non-hedgers are partly characterized by similar traits. Therefore, similar to our 
robustness test for TL exposure, we re-ran the regressions on CT and AT exposure, allowing 
only firms that did not hedge any other type of FX exposure to remain in the sample as non-
hedgers. As expected, this lead to substantial increases in the McFadden R
2 values. For 
instance, the R
2 for the regressions using AT exposure hedging as the dependent variable 
increased with a factor of two. For the regression results on CT and AT exposure the p-values 
for liquidity and the industry dummies are found to indicate significance at a 10 percent level 
more frequently than for the regressions presented in Table 3. We interpret this as evidence 
that a relationship between transaction exposure hedging and liquidity exists, as predicted by 
theory. As for FX exposure in Table 3, the coefficients for the market-to-book ratio are found 
to be positive and significant for CT and AT exposure for year 2000. Finally, the negative 




                                                 
10 Detailed results are available by request from the authors. 
  164.2. Regression estimates on the degree of exposure hedged 
In the questionnaires respondents are asked how much of their TL, CT, and AT exposure they 
hedged with currency derivatives. Firms that hedged TL exposure hedged on average 58.4 
percent of their exposure, whereas the equivalent figures for CT and AT exposure were 79.0 
and 53.4 percent, respectively. That firms that hedged a particular type of exposure with 
currency derivatives did so to hedge a substantial part of it is in accordance with survey 
results of Hakkarainen et al. (1998). This finding is also consistent with the view that hedging 
only a minor part of the exposure is uneconomical due to large fixed costs. 
To investigate the level of exposure hedged, we use Tobit regressions and a model 
proposed by Cragg (1971), which is a combination of a probit analysis (i.e., the decision to 
hedge) and a truncated regression (i.e., the regression equation for nonzero outcomes). The 
results from the Tobit model and the first step of the Cragg model, the probit analysis, are 
broadly similar to the results presented in Table 3. For the second step of the Cragg model 
almost all coefficients are non-significant for all regressions which is in parallel with the 
results of Allayannis and Ofek (2001). The results from the Tobit regressions and the Cragg 
model, together with the fact that the firms that hedged a particular type of exposure did so 
extensively, suggest that the decision as to whether hedges should be employed or not is of 
more interest for this type of study than the decision regarding how much of the exposure 
should be hedged. 
 
4.3. Logit regression estimates on the likelihood of beginning to use financial hedges  
To further examine the robustness of the results presented in Table 3, we use logit regressions 
to compare those firms that began to hedge TL, CT, and AT exposure with those firms that 
did not. The reason for not investigating firms that began to hedge FX exposure or firms that 
  17quit hedging is that these groups contain too few observations to allow for a meaningful 
analysis (see Figure 1). 
Table 4 presents the results on the likelihood that a firm began to hedge TL, CT, and AT 
exposure using financial hedges. The use of explanatory variables between Table 3 and 4 
differs in two respects. First, the regressions in Table 4 use both the levels of the explanatory 
variables as well as the change, in percent, from the previous year. Second, the industry 
dummies and the dummy indicating existence of loan covenants, that are used in Table 3, are 
not used in the regressions presented in Table 4. The rationale for not including industry 
dummies is that industry belonging typically do not change between years, while the reason 
for omitting the dummy concerning loan covenants is that this information is only available 
for two years. 
Like Table 3, Table 4 shows that firm size is significantly associated with hedging of 
TL, CT, and AT exposure. It can be seen that the likelihood of a firm begins to hedge CT and 
AT exposure is positively associated with its ANE. The association between liquidity and CT 
exposure hedging is also in parallel with the results in Table 3. Overall, the results presented 
in Table 4 corroborate the results presented in Table 3. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this study, we examine Swedish firms’ use of financial hedges to reduce foreign exchange 
exposure for 1997–2001. We use survey data which makes it possible to differentiate between 
hedging aimed at translation exposure and transaction exposure respectively. 
The survey responses show that use of financial hedges is widespread. We find that more 
than 50% of the firms employ financial hedges and that transaction exposure is more 
frequently hedged than translation exposure. About 20 percent of the firms hedge their 
translation exposure which is interesting given that the finance literature generally 
  18recommends that translation exposure should not be hedged. Butler (2000) among others, 
however, argues that translation exposure hedging may be rational in the presence of loan 
covenants that require firm performance to be maintained within certain levels and that a 
violation of a loan covenant can lead to a reduction in borrowing capacity. We document a 
positive relationship between existence of loan covenants and translation exposure hedging 
which provides support for the conjecture that firms hedge translation exposure in order to 
secure their access to funds. 
As predicted by theory, liquidity is negatively related to transaction exposure hedging 
supporting that firms hedge in response to expected financial distress costs. We also find that 
the likelihood of hedging foreign exchange exposure increases with firm size and exposure 
suggesting that economies of scale affects firms hedging decisions. Based on this evidence we 
conclude that Swedish firms hedge in way that is consistent with shareholder value 
maximization. 
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Table 1 
Data on foreign exchange exposure and frequency of hedging 
Panel A, presents foreign revenues (FR), foreign costs (FC), foreign equity (FE), and the absolute value of the 
difference between FR and FC  (ANE) for the pooled sample of firm-year observations. In Panel B the 
percentage of firms that hedged foreign exchange (FX) exposure, translation (TL) exposure, committed 
transactions (CT), and anticipated transactions (AT) for the pooled sample of firm-year observations are 
presented. The sample consists of firms listed on the Stockholm stock exchange and are divided into different 
groups based on size. A book value of total assets of less than SEK 500 million was considered small, more than 
SEK 500 million but less than SEK 5000 million was considered medium, and more than SEK 5000 million was 
considered large.  
Panel A: FX exposure in percent    Panel B: Frequency of hedging in percent 
            
 All  Small  Medium  Large     All  Small  Medium  Large 
FR 39.5%  32.2%  36.0%  57.8%    FX  57.2% 35.4% 56.8% 88.9% 
FC 30.6%  23.5%  28.3%  45.9%    TL 23.1%  9.5%  22.5%  43.1% 
FE  17.8% 8.0% 16.8%  33.2%    CT  42.6% 25.5% 38.9% 76.6% 
ANE 16.7%  22.0%  14.1%  16.6%    AT  31.8% 17.6% 30.5% 56.0% 
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Figure 1 
Comparison of variability in hedging policy 
This figure reports the percentage of firms that began, quite, or did not change its policy as to whether foreign 
exchange (FX), translation (TL), committed transaction (CT), and/or anticipated transaction (AT) exposure 

























Summary statistics on explanatory variables 
Summary statistics of explanatory variables for each year and for the pooled sample of firm-year observations. 
The sample consists of firms listed on the Stockholm stock exchange that responded on the questionnaire. All 
variables are as defined in section 3. The table reports the median value for Firm size, Liquidity, and Market-to-
book. For the dummy variables, Manufacturing, Services, Primary products and Loan covenants are the mean 
values reported. 
   Firm size  Liquidity  Leverage Market-to-B. Manufact.  Services  Primary prod. Loan coven.
               
1997  1520  1.65  1.47 1.34 0.37  0.55  0.08  - 
1998  885  1.72  1.24 1.25 0.32  0.63  0.05  - 
1999  1245  1.78  1.24 1.65 0.32  0.63  0.05  - 
2000  1202  2.12  0.99 1.50 0.32  0.63  0.05  0.24 
2001  853  1.91  1.11 1.24 0.32  0.63  0.05  0.28 
Pooled  1121  1.85  1.17 1.36 0.33  0.62  0.05  - 
                          




  24 
Table 3 
Logit regression estimates of the likelihood of using financial hedges 
Logit regression estimates of the relation between the likelihood that a firm uses financial hedges to hedge and 
proxies for incentives to hedge and proxies for foreign exchange exposure. The sample consists of firms listed 
on the Stockholm stock exchange. In Panel A the dependent variable is set to one if the firm uses financial 
hedges to hedge foreign exchange (FX) exposure. Panel B uses translation (TL) exposure hedging with 
financial hedges as the dependent variable, Panel C uses committed transaction (CT) exposure hedging with 
financial hedges as the dependent variable, and Panel D uses anticipated transaction (AT) exposure hedging 
with financial hedges as the dependent variable. The explanatory variables are: Firm size, the logaritmn of total 
assets: Liquidity, the current ratio: Leverage, the debt-to-equity ratio: Market-to-book, market value divided by 
book value of assets: Manufacturing and Primary products, dummy variables classifying firms into industries: 
Foreign equity (FE), the proportion of equity denominated in foreign currency: and Absolute net exposure
(ANE), the absolute value of the difference between the proportion of revenues and the proportion of costs 
denominated in foreign currency. P-values are presented in parentheses and based on a two-sided test. Values 
less than 0.10 are shown in boldface type. The significance tests are based on QML (Huber/White) standard 
errors & covariance. 
Panel A: Hedging FX exposure 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2000 2001 2001  Pooled 
Firm  size  0.680 0.772 0.889 0.701 0.658 0.444 0.368 0.646 
  (0.031) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.036) (0.098) (0.000) 
Liquidity  -0.049 -0.182 0.075 -0.154 -0.143 -0.276 -0.282 -0.105 
  (0.633) (0.171) (0.465) (0.018) (0.036) (0.144) (0.157) (0.009) 
Leverage  -0.343 -0.304 -0.096 0.280 0.255 0.137 0.108 -0.010 
  (0.139) (0.203) (0.439) (0.352) (0.382) (0.416) (0.507) (0.840) 
Market-to-book  -0.984 -0.671 -0.142 -0.052 -0.046 0.621  0.728 -0.126 
  (0.002) (0.000) (0.195) (0.505) (0.565) (0.047) (0.035) (0.030) 
Manufacturing -0.930 1.107  0.908 0.457 0.465 1.350 1.370 0.491 
  (0.337) (0.182) (0.124) (0.509) (0.499) (0.046) (0.049) (0.062) 
Primary products  34.651  2.615  3.234  35.229 41.196 36.114 36.119  2.845 
  (0.000) (0.098) (0.046) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) 
ANE  0.034 0.029 0.017 0.034 0.034 0.031 0.031 0.029 
  (0.056) (0.096) (0.138)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.031) (0.036) (0.000) 
FE  0.074 0.088 0.066 0.032 0.029 0.029 0.026 0.045 
  (0.070) (0.000) (0.003) (0.114) (0.155) (0.197) (0.230) (0.000) 
Loan covenants   -   -   -   -  0.464   -  0.688   - 
   -   -   -   -  (0.533)   -  (0.351)   - 
Log likelihood  -33.653  -36.785 -45.904 -48.890 -48.671 -36.764 -36.281  -229.688 
McFadden R2  39.2% 50.8% 31.3% 35.5% 38.4% 35.3% 38.7% 33.8% 
Observations  91  108 109 110 109  90  89  508 
          
Panel B: Hedging TL exposure 
       1998 1999 2000 2000 2001 2001  Pooled 
Firm size    0.320  0.039  0.447 0.437 0.318 0.260 0.339 
   (0.080)  (0.848)  (0.028) (0.028) (0.066) (0.121)  (0.000) 
Liquidity    -0.499 -0.232 -0.213 -0.197 -0.494 -0.690 -0.221 
   (0.051)  (0.407)  (0.043) (0.069) (0.122)  (0.067) (0.034) 
Leverage   -0.330  -0.320  0.209 0.129 0.007 -0.037  -0.062 
    (0.213) (0.172) (0.457) (0.696) (0.953) (0.765) (0.412) 
Market-to-book   -1.491  -0.411  -0.463 -0.501 0.049 0.212 -0.387 
   (0.060)  (0.355)  (0.028) (0.023) (0.884) (0.559) (0.036) 
Manufacturing  -0.184  -0.460 0.940 0.981 1.446 1.574 0.373 
    (0.812) (0.521) (0.181) (0.184) (0.032) (0.035) (0.237) 
Primary products    0.247  0.243 3.027 3.049 3.572 4.045 1.451 
    (0.772) (0.781) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
  25FE    0.024 0.030 0.027 0.030 0.017 0.022 0.020 
    (0.027) (0.010) (0.026) (0.011) (0.183)  (0.096) (0.000) 
Loan covenants     -   -   -  1.451   -  1.513   - 
     -   -   -  (0.022)   -  (0.025)   - 
Log  likelihood    -39.780 -42.278 -36.749 -31.931 -38.139 -33.830  -170.443 
McFadden R2    28.9% 20.9% 40.3% 48.0% 28.7% 36.4% 24.4% 
Observations    108 109 111 110  91  90  419 
          
Panel C: Hedging CT exposure 
       1998 1999 2000 2000 2001 2001  Pooled 
Firm size    0.810  0.722  0.473 0.397 0.371 0.319 0.513 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.009) (0.007) (0.025) (0.000) 
Liquidity    -0.192 0.107 -0.249 -0.244 -0.231 -0.218 -0.161 
   (0.165)  (0.234)  (0.020) (0.030) (0.130) (0.149) (0.000) 
Leverage   -0.374  -0.037  0.109 0.074 0.084 0.077 -0.020 
   (0.065)  (0.619) (0.626) (0.721) (0.415) (0.441) (0.716) 
Market-to-book   -0.435  -0.142  -0.012 0.013 0.094 0.146 -0.088 
   (0.039)  (0.148) (0.862) (0.861) (0.681) (0.542) (0.065) 
Manufacturing  1.436  1.397  0.458 0.455 0.325 0.395 0.784 
   (0.038) (0.009) (0.434) (0.424) (0.546) (0.470) (0.002) 
Primary products    2.802  2.890  0.264 0.233 -0.259 -0.220 1.331 
   (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.859) (0.886) (0.873) (0.895) (0.082) 
ANE    0.015 0.020 0.022 0.024 0.026 0.025 0.020 
    (0.204)  (0.062) (0.023) (0.020) (0.016) (0.017) (0.000) 
Loan covenants     -   -   -  0.924   -  0.331   - 
     -   -   -  (0.098)    - (0.537)   - 
Log likelihood    -50.640  -57.772  -61.852 -59.915 -55.123 -54.514  -240.397 
McFadden R2    35.2% 26.4% 21.0% 22.6% 14.7% 14.6% 19.9% 
Observations    113 115 116 115  94  93  438 
          
Panel D: Hedging AT exposure 
       1998 1999 2000 2000 2001 2001  Pooled 
Firm size    0.527  0.411  0.455 0.387 0.322 0.251 0.427 
    (0.001) (0.022) (0.000) (0.002) (0.013) (0.076) (0.000) 
Liquidity    -0.086 0.009 -0.047 -0.035 -0.143 -0.128 -0.054 
    (0.427) (0.911) (0.314) (0.489) (0.152) (0.204) (0.131) 
Leverage   -0.177  -0.097  0.009 -0.053 0.137 0.125 0.003 
    (0.390) (0.611) (0.970) (0.845) (0.205) (0.241) (0.950) 
Market-to-book   -0.247  -0.218  -0.115 -0.090 0.252 0.330 -0.135 
    (0.127)  (0.044)  (0.143) (0.242) (0.241) (0.136) (0.003) 
Manufacturing  0.609  0.443  0.397 0.402 0.292 0.387 0.345 
    (0.319) (0.415) (0.522) (0.527) (0.603) (0.512) (0.166) 
Primary products    2.777  1.030 0.335 0.309 0.157 0.186 1.034 
   (0.026)  (0.431) (0.751) (0.747) (0.897) (0.864) (0.103) 
ANE    0.013 0.020 0.021 0.023 0.019 0.019 0.019 
    (0.258)  (0.065) (0.018) (0.010) (0.080) (0.077) (0.000) 
Loan  covenants       1.075    0.539   
       (0.039)   (0.305)  
Log likelihood    -57.982 -62.484 -64.854 -62.282 -55.206 -54.082  -248.809 
McFadden R2    20.6% 16.7% 15.2% 17.5% 14.3% 14.9% 14.1% 
Observations  112 114 116 115  94  93  436 
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